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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USE OF EXCESSIVE
FORCE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT
Karen M Blum*
John J. Ryan**
I. INTRODUCTION
PROFESSOR BLUM: A variety of circumstances and con-
texts may give rise to a Section 1983 action asserting a claim of ex-
cessive use of force. Depending upon the context in which the force
is used, different constitutional standards will apply.
A. Use of Force Under the Fourth Amendment
Where force is used in the context of an arrest, an investiga-
tory stop, or other seizure of a free citizen, the Fourth Amendment
will apply.' The standard governing the officer's conduct under the
Fourth Amendment is one of objective reasonableness, as stated by
. Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. This Article is based on a presentation
given at the Practising Law Institute's Twenty-Fourth Annual Conference on Section 1983
Civil Rights Litigation, in New York, New York.
- Co-Director of the Legal and Liability Risk Management Institute. Mr. Ryan is a graduate
of Suffolk University Law School and a member of the Rhode Island and Federal Bars. Mr.
Ryan retired in 2002 as Captain of the Providence Police Department after serving there for
twenty years. He currently lectures on police misconduct and liability issues for law en-
forcement in various forums across the country and is the author of numerous police field
guides, including, Case Law for Critical Tasks in Law Enforcement, A Legal Guide for Offi-
cers and Supervisors, which is updated annually at the end of each Supreme Court Term.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV states, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated ......
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the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor.2 The test of constitutional-
ity is whether the officer's conduct was objectively reasonable given
"the totality of the circumstances."
3
With respect to the use of deadly force in terms of the Fourth
Amendment, we now know, after the Supreme Court's decision in
Scott v. Harris, that there are no "magical on/off' pre-conditions that
must be satisfied to justify the use of such force.4 Scott has clearly
impacted the approach to deadly force cases, especially in the Ninth
Circuit, but also in any other jurisdiction where a deadly force in-
struction has been used.'
Prior to Scott, Tennessee v. Garner6 was interpreted by some
courts to have required that a jury receive an instruction indicating
the special circumstances under which deadly force could be used.7
2 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
3 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985). See also United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411,417-18 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
4 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1777 (2007).
5 See generally Karen M. Blum, Scott v. Harris: Death Knell for Deadly Force Policies
and Garner Jury Instructions?, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 45 (2007).
6 471 U.S. 1.
7 Currently, the Third and Seventh Circuits include Garner language in their Model Jury
Instructions for deadly force cases. For a plaintiff to succeed in a deadly force claim, the
Third Circuit requires that the plaintiffprove:
[D]eadly force was not necessary to prevent [plaintiff's] escape; or [de-
fendant] did not have probable cause to believe that [plaintiff] posed a
significant threat of serious physical injury to [defendant] or others; or it
would have been feasible for [defendant] to give [plaintiff] a warning be-
fore using deadly force, but [defendant] did not do so.
THIRD CIRCUIT MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 4.9.1 (2008), available at
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/civiljuryinstructions/Final-Instructions/anuary2O08/Chap_4_2
008_revised.pdf. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit instructs that "[an officer may use deadly
force when a reasonable officer, under the same circumstances, would believe that the sus-
pect's actions placed him or others in the immediate vicinity in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily harm." SEVENTH CIRCUIT FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 7.09 (2005),
available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/7thcivinstruc2005.pdf. While the Eighth Circuit
does not have a separate deadly force instruction that tracks Garner, the Court held, in Rahn
v. Hawkins, 464 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 2006) that "[j]ury instructions that discuss only excessive
2
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Based on Scott, the Ninth Circuit, in Acosta v. Hill,8 overruled Mon-
roe v. City of Phoenix9 which had held an excessive force instruction
based on the more general reasonableness standard of Graham was
not a substitute for a Garner deadly force instruction.' 0 Therefore,
after Scott, a Garner instruction is no longer required, at least the
Ninth Circuit and most likely in other jurisdictions as well. A post-
Scott decision out of the Southern District of New York, Blake v. City
of New York' 1 indicated that court likewise would not require a
deadly force instruction.
12
To trigger Fourth Amendment protections and activate the ob-
jective reasonableness standard, there must be an arrest, an investiga-
tory stop or some other "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 13 The definition of seizure can be nuanced, but the Su-
preme Court has held that a seizure requires the "termination of free-
dom of movement through means intentionally applied.'
14
This is why ramming the suspect's car in Scott was a sei-
force in only a general way do not adequately inform a jury about when a police officer may
use deadly force." Id. at 818.
8 504 F.3d 1323 (9th Cir. 2007).
9 248 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2001).
10 See Acosta, 504 F.3d at 1324 ("Monroe's holding that an excessive force instruction
based on the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard is not a substitute for a deadly
force instruction is therefore overruled."). See also Monroe, 248 F.3d at 859. The Ninth
Circuit has since withdrawn its Garner deadly force instruction, instead combining deadly
and nondeadly force under a single excessive force instruction. See NINTH CIRCUIT MANUAL
OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§ 9.22, 9.23 (2007), available at
http://207.41.19.15/web/sdocuments.nsf/1 ae2dda702db203388256aae0064d796/$FILE/3.20
08%20final%20civil.pdf.
" No. 05-CV-6652, 2007 WL 1975570, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2007).
12 SeeBlake, 2007 WL 1975570 at *2-4.
13 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 388.
14 Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989).
3
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zure. 15 The contact was not accidental. This was not an officer unin-
tentionally bumping into a suspect's car, but was rather an officer
terminating Harris's movement by "means intentionally applied."
The officer's actions constituted a seizure, bringing into play the ob-
jective reasonableness standard.
One question raised by the Scott scenario of force applied to
stop a vehicle is that of who exactly is being seized when there is
more than one occupant. The Supreme Court recently decided
Brendlin v. California,'6 finding that a passenger is seized when a
driver is pulled over.'7 In other words, when an officer pulls over a
car, the officer initiates a Fourth Amendment seizure of not just the
driver, but anyone else in the car.
A similar question existed in Fisher v. City of Memphis, 8
where an officer, not necessarily aiming at any of the occupants, shot
at a car that nearly ran him down, striking a passenger. The Sixth
Circuit held that the passenger was seized when the car was shot at,
even though the officer was not aiming for the passenger, but rather
the car itself.19 Therefore, where the intent of the officer was to stop
the car and the officer fires his gun, anybody in the car may be con-
sidered "seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
15 See Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1776.
16 Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400 (2007).
17 Id. at 2403.
'8 234 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2000).
'9 Fisher, 234 F.3d at 318-19. ("[The] car was the intended target .... By shooting at the
driver of the moving car, [the officer] intended to stop the car, effectively seizing everyone
inside, including the Plaintiff [passenger].")
[Vol. 24572
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B. Excessive Force Claims Under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments by Persons in Custody
In addition to excessive force claims in the Fourth Amend-
ment context, claims are brought by convicted prisoners complaining
about the use of force by prison officials under the Eighth Amend-
ment.2 ° With respect to the standard applied, it is no longer one of
objective reasonableness. Rather, the Supreme Court cases of
Whitley v. Albers21 and Hudson v. McMillian22 govern, and call for a
standard that is much more deferential to prison officials. 23 A pris-
oner complaining of excessive force must show a much higher level
of culpability in the form of a malicious and sadistic use of force to
cause harm, unrelated to any legitimate penological purpose.24
Excessive force claims are also brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment25 by persons who are in custody but not convicted, such
as pretrial detainees. In the context of Fourteenth Amendment
claims, especially by pretrial detainees, standards vary widely. In a
use of force case, some circuits borrow from the Eighth Amendment,
some from the Fourth Amendment, and still others hold force cannot
be used against pretrial detainees for punitive purposes, but must in-
stead serve a legitimate non-punitive function-a standard taken from
20 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
2 1 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
22 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
23 See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. See also Linda Greenhouse,
High Court Defines New Limit on Force by a Prison Guard, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1992, at
Al.
24 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481
F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides, in pertinent part: "No State shall ... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
573
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Bell v. Wolfish. 26
In Fuentes v. Wagner,27 the Third Circuit applied the same
Eighth Amendment standard to a pretrial detainee's excessive force
claim that is applied to claims by convicted prisoners.2 A pretrial
detainee involved in some sort of disturbance while in the prison
would have to show a malicious and sadistic use of force occurred in
order to prevail on what would be a Fourteenth Amendment substan-
tive due process claim. 29  However, the Ninth Circuit in Gibson v.
County of Washoe30 applied the Fourth Amendment objective reason-
ableness standard to use of force claims by pretrial detainees.31
The courts that apply the Bell standard look to whether there
is a rational, legitimate reason for using force or whether it is, in es-
sence, an arbitrary use, constituting punishment. 32 The reasoning be-
hind this position is that while convicted prisoners may not be sub-
jected to "cruel and unusual" punishment, pretrial detainees cannot be
punished at all.33 So if the use of force against a pretrial detainee is
26 441 U.S. 520, 535-37 (1979).
27 206 F.3d 335 (3rd Cir. 2000).
28 See Fuentes, 206 F.3d at 347 (holding that the Eight Amendment standards found in
Whitley and Hudson also apply to a pretrial detainee's prison disturbance excessive force
claim).
29 Id. at 347-48.
30 290 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2002).
31 Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1197 ("Although the Supreme Court has not expressly decided [this
issue] ... we have determined that the Fourth Amendment sets the applicable constitutional
limitations for considering claims of excessive force during pretrial detention." (citations and
internal quotations omitted)).
32 See, e.g., United States v. Budd, 496 F.3d 517, 530 (6th Cir. 2007). "Under Wolfish, in
the absence of 'an expressed intent to punish,' the question is whether the challenged prac-
tice or behavior 'is reasonably related to a legitimate government objective.' " Id. (quoting
Bell, 441 U.S. at 538). "If the action is 'arbitrary or purposeless[,] a court permissibly may
infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally
be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.' " Id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 539).
33 See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 158 (3rd Cir. 2005) (holding punishment may not
6
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simply for the purpose of punishment, the force is not sanctioned by
the Constitution.34
In addition to cases involving pretrial detainees, you have
cases such as Davis v. Rennie35 and Andrews v. Neer,36 that involve
involuntarily committed mental patients. These individuals are not
convicted, they are not really even pretrial detainees, but are in the
custody of the state because they were involuntarily committed. Both
the First and the Eighth Circuits apply the objective reasonableness
test to the use of force against involuntarily committed persons.37
C. The Twilight Zone
In your practice, you may confront a set of facts that falls into
what courts often refer to as the "twilight zone. 38 Such cases in-
volve conduct that occurs in the time between when the arrest is
made and pretrial detention begins. 39 This zone might include, for
example, the period after an individual who has been arrested is
placed in the back of a squad car but before arriving at the station-
house, or the period during which an arrestee is at the stationhouse
being processed or booked. Here, the courts must determine what
standard applies-is the challenged conduct committed in the context
be inflicted upon detainee prior to a finding of guilt).
34 Id.
3' 264 F.3d 86 (lst Cir. 2001).
36 253 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2001).
37 See Davis, 264 F.3d at 101-02; Andrews, 253 F.3d at 1061.
38 See Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 2000). See also Stephens v. Butler,
509 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1108 (S.D. Ala. 2007).
39 See Stephens, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 ("[T]here is a practical gap, a 'legal twilight
zone,' between the completion of the arrest as that term is commonly used and the beginning
of pretrial detainment.").
7
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of a seizure, and thus governed by the Fourth Amendment, or is the
suspect now a detainee, and the conduct subject to Fourteenth
Amendment standards?
Most circuits take the position that if the arrestee is still in the
custody of the arresting officer-if the incident happened shortly af-
ter the arrest or even at the stationhouse during the booking or finger-
printing processes, the incident is still in the context of the Fourth
Amendment and the objective reasonableness standard will therefore
apply. 40 The Eleventh Circuit, however, appears to have conflicting
cases on this question, illustrating the difficulties inherent in deter-
mining the correct standard.4' In one instance, a person was in the
back of a squad car after arrest, on the way to the stationhouse when
force was used. The Eleventh Circuit analyzed the plaintiffs claim
in terms of the Fourth Amendment.42 In an earlier case, however,
also involving a suspect subjected to force while being transported in
the back of a police car following his arrest, the court invoked the
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis.43  The
40 See, e.g., Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 403 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding claims re-
garding conditions of confinement brought by pre-trial detainees are governed by Fourth
Amendment until there has been judicial determination of probable cause); Bryant v. City of
New York, 404 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[I]t is well established that the Fourth
Amendment governs the procedures applied during some period following arrest."); Phelps
v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding the Fourth Amendment applicable to
claims of arrestee arising while in the custody of arresting officers); Fontana v. Haskin, 262
F.3d 871, 878, 879 (9th Cir. 2001); Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989)
("We think the Fourth Amendment standard probably should be applied at least to the period
prior to the time when the person arrested is arraigned or formally charged, and remains in
the custody (sole or joint) of the arresting officer.").
41 See Stephens, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 1109 (noting ambiguity within the circuit on the point
"beyond which the Fourth Amendment ceases to apply"). See also Rosa v. City of Fort
Myers, 2007 WL 3012650, at *12, *14 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2007).
42 Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2002).
43 Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1492 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (analyzing claim that arrestee
was subject to excessive force in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment).
576 [Vol. 24
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Eleventh Circuit has similarly applied different standards to excessive
force claims based on conduct occurring during the fingerprinting
and booking process. 44
In many cases excessive force claims brought under the
Fourth Amendment will be joined with a claim for failure to provide
medical treatment. In other words, if the police use a Taser, or their
firearms, or generally subject a person to force, the plaintiff will often
claim not only that excessive force was used, but also that the police
then failed to call for an ambulance or otherwise failed to properly
provide for medical treatment. Most circuits treat these additional
claims of failure to provide medical treatment as arising under the
Fourteenth Amendment, applying a standard of subjective deliberate
indifference akin to that applied with respect to convicted prisoners
under the Eighth Amendment.45
However, in a relatively new development, there are now at
least two circuits that have indicated the standard to apply in such
situations is not the deliberate indifference standard. Decisions out of
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, Sides v. City of Champaign46 and
Boone v. Spurgess,47 favor an objective reasonableness standard over
44 Compare Redd v. Conway, 160 Fed. App'x 858, 861 (11 th Cir. 2005) (applying Four-
teenth Amendment substantive due process analysis to claims of excessive force during ar-
rest and booking process) and Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d 1246 (11 th Cir. 2005). In Hicks,
the defendants did not argue otherwise, so the court assumed the plaintiff was still being
"seized" during fingerprinting process. Hicks, 422 F.3d at 1254 n.7.
45 See, e.g., Barrie v. Grand County, 119 F.3d 862, 868-69 (10th Cir. 1997); Weyant v.
Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[T]he official custodian of a pretrial detainee may
be found liable for violating the detainee's due process rights if the official denied treatment
needed to remedy a serious medical condition and did so because of his deliberate indiffer-
ence to that need."); Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 956 (1st Cir. 1992).
46 496 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2007).
4' 385 F.3d 923 (6th Cir. 2004).
9
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the deliberate indifference standard as more appropriate in claims of
failure to attend to medical needs during the course of a Fourth
Amendment seizure.
In Sides, the plaintiff, detained in a parking lot for public in-
decency, alleged the officers involved acted with deliberate indiffer-
ence toward his complaints of heatstroke. The Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, however, couched his claim in terms of the Fourth
Amendment, finding it was a matter that arose in the course of the
seizure and should therefore be governed by an objective reasonable-
ness standard.48 The Sixth Circuit concluded essentially the same
thing in Boone, although it reserved decision on the matter because
the plaintiffs claim failed under both the objective reasonableness
and deliberate indifference standards.49
D. Accidental or Unintentional Termination of
Movement
The last category in use-of-force jurisprudence involves
claims brought by individuals who were neither in custody nor
seized, as was the case in County of Sacramento v. Lewis.50 These
types of claims frequently arise in the high-speed pursuit context,
where the suspect or police run into an innocent person. These inci-
dents are not "seizures" because they are not a termination of move-
ment by means intentionally applied.51 Instead, they involve acciden-
48 Sides, 496 F.3d at 827-28.
49 See Boone, 385 F.3d at 934 ("[T]here seems to be no logical distinction between exces-
sive force claims and denial of medical care claims when determining the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment.").
50 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
5' Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843-44.
[Vol. 24
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tal or unintentional termination of movement.
Lewis involved a police chase of two people on a motorcycle.
The driver of the motorcycle tried to maneuver around a comer, but
did not quite make it. The passenger flew off and was killed when he
was struck by the pursuing officer's car.52 The officer in Lewis did
not intend to terminate that passenger's movement by running him
over. As such, this was not a seizure-the Fourth Amendment objec-
tive reasonableness standard does not apply.53
Instead of a Fourth Amendment claim, there is a substantive
due process claim that might be asserted under the Fourteenth
Amendment, but the level of culpability that must be demonstrated in
the context of a rapidly evolving emergency situation is a very high
one. To succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate con-
duct by the officer that "shocks the conscience" of the court.14 In
Lewis, this would essentially require a showing that the officer acted
for the sole purpose of harming the plaintiff, with no legitimate law
enforcement purpose at all.
Most of the case law after Lewis demonstrates that, where
there is an emergency situation, conduct is very unlikely to rise to the
level of "conscience shocking."5 6 This is the case in any kind of
emergency response, even if it is not a high-speed pursuit, where of-
52 Id. at 837.
13 Id. at 843-44.
14 See id. at 846-47.
" See id. at 845-46.
56 See, e.g., Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169, 1177 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he Lewis stan-
dard of 'intent to harm' applies to all high-speed chases."); Meals v. City of Memphis, 493
F.3d 720, 730 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding no evidence that police officer intended to harm per-
son being pursued or innocent bystanders); Dillon v. Brown County, 380 F.3d 360, 364 (8th
Cir. 2004) (holding that the "intent to harm" standard is not restricted to police chases).
11
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ficers do not have much time to deliberate. However, in certain situa-
tions that do not involve a seizure and where there is time to deliber-
ate, conduct of a less-culpable nature may be sufficient. In these cir-
cumstances, deliberate indifference might be sufficient to shock the
conscience.57 Deliberate indifference is clearly the standard any time
someone who is in custody brings a substantive due process claim.58
With so many different standards applying varying degrees of
deference, it is very important for litigants in claims involving use of
force to determine early on into which category their claims fall. The
best category for plaintiffs is always going to be the Fourth Amend-
ment objective reasonableness standard. Defendants will want to
have the conscience-shocking standard applied, requiring plaintiffs to
demonstrate purpose to harm or at least subjective deliberate indiffer-
ence.
II. ANALYZING EXCESSIVE FORCE CASES AND IDENTIFYING
SPECIFIC AREAS OF RISK
MR. RYAN: There are many recent developments in the area
57 See, e.g., McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Schools, 433 F.3d 460, 469 (6th Cir. 2006) (de-
liberate indifference appropriate standard where teacher had opportunity to reflect and to de-
liberate before leaving several children unsupervised in the classroom); Bukowski v. City of
Akron, 326 F.3d 702, 710 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[D]eliberate-indifference standard is appropriate
in settings [that] provide the opportunity for reflection and unhurried judgments, but ... a
higher bar may be necessary when opportunities for reasoned deliberation are not present."
(internal quotations omitted)); Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 652 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (applying deliberate indifference standard to claim stemming from planned under-
cover operation); Brown v. Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579, 592 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying
deliberate indifference standard to claim arising from planned sting operation). The Third
Circuit has articulated a third standard, somewhere in between "intent to harm" and deliber-
ate indifference. See, e.g,, Phillips v. County of Allegheny, No. 062869, 2008 WL 305025,
at * 13 (3d Cir. Feb. 8, 2008) ("[U]nder Sanford [v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2006)], three
possible standards can be used to determine whether state action shocked the conscience: (1)
deliberate indifference; (2) gross negligence or arbitrariness that indeed shocks the con-
science; or (3) intent to cause harm.").
58 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851.
12
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of excessive force from the perspective of law enforcement and
courts alike.
A. The Graham Three-Part Test
One of the trends we see is the three-part test under Graham
v. Connor,59 which is what courts use to determine whether an offi-
cer's use of force is reasonable. We apply this Graham standard in
law enforcement training. In using "Graham, many police agencies
around the country are doing away with the term "use of force" com-
pletely and are adopting a "response to resistance" policy and "re-
sponse to resistance" training.
The theory behind the response to resistance concept is that,
in most cases a uniformed officer approaches someone, exercises le-
gal authority, establishes command presence, gives a verbal com-
mand, and the person complies, then the interaction ends. The person
is handcuffed and that is the end of it. However, what you see in
many of these cases is an officer approaches someone, the person de-
cides not to comply, and so the officer is forced to respond to the sub-
ject's resistance.
We can break down the Graham test simplistically: the worse
a bad guy is, the more authority an officer has to use force under
Graham. The more serious an offense is, the more force an officer
may use.60 The more of a physical threat the perpetrator poses, the
'9 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
60 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 ("Determining whether the force used to effect a particular
seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature
and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the
countervailing governmental interests at stake." (internal citation omitted)).
13
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more force an officer may use.6 1 Also, the more a perpetrator ac-
tively resists or attempts to evade arrest by flight, the more force an
officer may use.
The Graham test, which is the foundation for all use of force
decision-making, has not been drilled into law enforcement officers.
Now, we advise police officers to think about the Graham test. I
have conducted some agency audits, and I still see some agencies us-
ing the "malicious and sadistic" test,62 not the Graham three-part
test,63 which is really what officers need to consider, particularly
when they are arresting someone.
B. Use of Force Continuum
If you are presented with a use-of-force case and you look at
policy and training issues, you will see that police departments all
over the country have some kind of force continuum.64 Some are
shaped like a wheel called a "situational force model." The original
ones were built more like a ladder.65 Departments have moved away
61 Id. ("The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspec-
tive of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.").
62 One of the factors a court examines in determining the constitutionality of a particular
use of force is "whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore disci-
pline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Johnson v.
Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973).
63 See John J. Ryan, Use of Force: Deadly/Non-Deadly, 764 PRACTISING LAW INST. 239,
249 (2007) (summarizing that under Graham, a court examines three factors when determin-
ing if an officer's use of deadly force was reasonable: "(1) the severity of the offense sus-
pect; (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the officer or others; and (3)
whether the suspect was actively resisting or attempting to evade arrest by flight.").
64 See Ryan P. Hatch, Note, Coming Together to Resolve Police Misconduct: The Emer-
gence of Mediation as a New Solution, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 447, 478 (2006) ("[I]n
training police officers, most police departments employ some type of "use of force contin-
uum").
65 The use of force continuum
often takes the form of a pyramid or ladder[] that represents a "fluid and
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from this because they say it creates officer misunderstanding.66
For example, if an officer were to pull up and see a bank rob-
ber pointing a gun at someone, does the officer have to establish
command presence and begin giving verbal commands, trying soft
empty-hand control first, then using chemical spray? No. In some
cases, the officer will come in and it will be objectively reasonable to
use the highest level of force right from the outset. To explain this to
officers, we say: as the subject's resistance levels go up, as the seri-
ousness of the crime goes up, as the active resistance goes up, so does
the officer's ability to use force at a higher degree.
All of the model policies out there, the latest and greatest
studies, are classifying the Taser, an electronic control device, with
chemical sprays as a very low level use of force. The Police Execu-
tive Research Forum just published a study putting the Taser at that
flexible police guide" for officers to use in the field when confronted
with a situation requiring force. At the first, or lowest level of the typi-
cal use of force continuum is the mere presence of an officer, which in-
cludes body language, demeanor, and identification of authority. The
second level of force involves verbal communication - giving a direct
order, questioning, or persuasion - when the individual is argumentative
or verbally resistant. The third level of force involves an officer using
physical contact, or "soft-hands techniques," which includes directional
contact or escorting an individual. In the fourth level of force, the police
officer uses physical control by means of takedown maneuvers, use of
pressure points, or other physical defensive tactics to gain compliance of
a physically resistive individual. The fifth level of force is classified as
serious physical control, whereby the use of impact or intermediate
weapons, or both, focused blows or kicks, or chemical irritants are au-
thorized. The sixth, and final, level on the use of force continuum is the
use of deadly force which encompasses "any force that is readily capable
of causing death or serious bodily injury."
Id. at 478-79.
66 See generally Paul W. Brown, The Continuum of Force in Community Supervision, 58
FED. PROBATION 31, 32 (1994) (stating that a use of force continuum is "flexible and relative.
Such flexibility may seem confusing in something that is supposed to serve the officer as a
guide to the proper use of force.").
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low level use of force.67 This becomes an issue to consider in use-of-
force cases.
C. Handcuffing
Next, we will look at cases involving a low level use of force,
such as a handcuffing case where there is an allegation the handcuffs
were too tight. Oftentimes, these cases have the potential for big
money outcomes.
In Gousse v. City of Los Angeles,68 the plaintiff, Dr. Gousse, a
neurosurgeon, flew to California from Miami, landed at LAX, and
rented a car at Budget Rental Car. He was driving slightly slower
than the traffic, which drew the attention of a pair of police officers.69
The officers, used their mobile data terminal to run the license plate
of the car, which came back as stolen. Unbeknownst to the doctor
and the officers, Budget Rental Car reported the car stolen when it
was returned late.7"
These officers performed what they call a high-risk traffic
stop. They screamed at Gousse, "Get out of the car!" and he
screamed back at them, "What have I done?" and the temperatures
flared up and the officers handcuffed him tightly. Gousse tried to tell
67 See James M. Cronin & Joshua A. Ederheimer, Conducted Energy Devices: Develop-
ment of Standards for Consistency and Guidance, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF CMTY.
ORIENTED POLICING SERVS. & POLICE EXECUT. RESEARCH FORUM (2006), available at
http://www.policeforum.org/upload/CED-Guidelines_414547688_2152007092436.pdf. See
also Shaun H. Kedir, Note, Stunning Trends in Shocking Crimes: A Comprehensive Analysis
of Taser Weapons, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 357, 364 (2007) ("Overall, the majority of law en-
forcement agencies in the United States place Tasers in the mid-range of the use-of-force
continuum scale.").
68 No. B 174896, 2007 WL 1056706, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2007).
69 Id. at *2.
70 Id. at *2, 24.
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them there is rental car paperwork in the glove box, but they did not
listen. The officers called Budget Rental's 1-800 number in the mid-
dle of the night, and tried to find out the car's status. Dr. Gousse was
handcuffed and brought to the police station for a period of time.
Eventually, he returns to Florida, has some tests run on his
arm, and discovers that he has permanent nerve damage running
down his arm to the extent that the doctor who examined him reports
him to Medical Licensing Board. He cannot practice unsupervised
neurosurgery ever again.71 What is this one handcuffing case worth?
The first time around, the jury came back with a verdict of $33 mil-
lion; $18 million against Budget, and $15 million against the police
agency. The judge vacated the jury's ruling on damages and deter-
mined that the jury's award to the Gousses "shock[ed] the con-
science. 72 I guess Dr. Gousse is more of a lecturer than he is a sur-
geon.
How are police officers trained in this area? One of the things
they are taught is, as soon as they get control of a situation and hand-
cuff someone, the ratchet mechanism that controls how handcuffs
lock will continually get tighter and tighter. If you lean on your
handcuffs while sitting in the back seat of a police car, they are going
to tighten up on you. Handcuffs work on a ratchet, and they only go
in one direction-tighter.73 However, every single set of handcuffs
that is made has a little pinhole in the side. If you ever looked at a
71 Id. at *3-5, 14.
72 Gousse, 2007 WL 1056706 at *11.
73 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE STANDARD FOR METALLIC
HANDCUFFS §5.6.2 (1982), available at
http://www.eeel.nist.gov/oles/Publications/NIJ%20Standard%200307-01 .pdf.
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handcuff key, there is a little needle on one end to double lock the
handcuffs so as to prevent them from ratcheting tighter. Officers all
over the country are trained to check for proper fit and double lock
the handcuffs as soon as the situation is controlled.74 If they are not
doing that, police departments run into these potential problems
where the handcuffs tighten up.
I come from Providence, Rhode Island, a small city geo-
graphically, where you could transport somebody to the police station
in three or four minutes from anywhere in the city. In rural Nevada,
you may have to transport someone in the back of a police car for
thirty to forty minutes while the handcuffs tighten up and that can be
far more serious.
D. Vulnerable Persons
Disabled persons present another issue that comes up a lot in
the low levels of force context. This includes persons with a legal
disability, but even someone who has some kind of injury. Try to put
your hands together behind your back and keep them there for a long
period of time and see how you feel.75
74 Ryan, supra note 63, at 252. Entities that have sound policy, which is enforced, and
proper training with respect to handcuffs are nearly impenetrable from a loss based on a con-
stitutional violation through handcuffing. Id.
75 Compare Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 774, 777-78 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding excessive
use of force where plaintiff-detainee was handcuffed too tightly behind his back for ten min-
utes, causing permanent nerve damage), with Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937 (6th Cir.
2002). In Burchett, officers detained an arrestee for three hours in a hot car with rolled-up
windows. Despite the handcuffs being so tight that the detainee's hands became numb and
blue, the court found that the force was not excessive because an officer removed the hand-
cuffs immediately upon the detainee's request. Burchett, 310 F.3d at 944-45. See also
Robles v. Prince George's County, 302 F.3d 262, 269-70 (4th Cir. 2002). The Robles court
found a violation of due process where officers tied the detainee to a pole in a dark parking
lot with three pairs of handcuffs, neither enhancing public nor officer safety, nor helping to
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One notable case comes out of Massachusetts: Aceto v.
Kachajian.76 In Aceto, an officer goes to arrest a woman with a mi-
nor warrant and she says, "Look, I hurt my shoulder playing hockey.
I am seeing a doctor, there is no way I can get my hands behind my
back," and the arresting officer uses something we hope we see in
most cases, something called common sense. The arresting officers
handcuffs this woman in the front and brings her to the station.77
However, this does not always happen, as evidenced in this
case. Different officers transported Aceto from the station to the jail.
A new officer then says, "Ma'am, put your hands behind your back."
She said, "I told the other officer I got this shoulder injury from play-
ing hockey. He handcuffed me in the front. Do you think you can do
the same? In fact, it is daytime. My office is open. You can even
call my doctor." The officer then responds, "Ma'am, department pol-
icy and training, all persons shall be handcuffed behind their back."
So he handcuffs her behind the back and causes further injury.78 This
is typical of the types of cases we see with people who are disabled or
injured.
We also see an awful lot of elderly cases in our business. It is
amazing to me what can occur in these types of cases. I just read a
case in the newspaper about a woman from Utah, seventy years old,
who let her lawn turn brown. There was a local ordinance that said
you have to keep your lawn green. The woman let it turn brown and
secure the detainee's presence at trial.
76 240 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D. Mass. 2003).
77 Aceto, 240 F. Supp. at 123.
78 Id.
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this police officer knocked her on the front door. The woman did not
want to give her name for the ticket because not only could she not
afford the water, but she could not afford the ticket either. The offi-
cer ended up tossing this seventy-year-old woman down on the
ground on her front stairs while trying to handcuff her.79 We see a lot
of these types of cases with the elderly.
There are some times when law enforcement does have to ar-
rest an elderly person. One of the examples I use is under our man-
datory arrest law for domestic violence. 80 What happens is that an of-
ficer will say, "Ma'am," or "Sir, turn around and put your hands
behind your back." "Officer, I am eighty-six. Is that really neces-
sary?" Then the officer responds, "Yes sir, sorry, department policy
and training." Or the officer says, "Ma'am, you got to move your
hands a little closer together because the chain is only this long."
And the person will respond, "That is the best I can do. I am eighty-
six." Then follows, "Let me help." I call these the wishbone cases
because of their brittle bones. 81
In sum, what you are looking for if you get one of these cases
is to see if there is any discretion built into the department and policy
and training on handcuffing. There should be some discretion built in
79 Ted McDonough, Hits & Misses, SALT LAKE CITY WEEKLY, July 12, 2007, at 8.
80 See Bonnie Brandl & Tess Meuer, Domestic Abuse in Later Life, 8 ELDER L.J. 297, 314
(2000) stating:
Most states have either a domestic violence mandatory arrest or pro-
arrest law. An arrest is mandated if specific behavior occurs between
persons in a certain relationship as defined by law. Some states have a
pro-arrest law stating that the officer may arrest if certain conditions ex-
ist, but does not mandate an arrest in all circumstances.
81 See, e.g., Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1434-36 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding as exces-
sive the handcuffing of a sixty-seven-year-old man tightly enough to cause pain and bruising
lasting for several weeks).
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both for people with disabilities and those with vulnerabilities like the
elderly.82
III. PAIN COMPLIANCE AND PEPPER SPRAY
Pain compliance is another area where we see a lot of police
officer training. For example, many police officers are trained to not
use pepper spray as a pain-compliance technique. Law enforcement
recognizing that even if the person complies, once you use pepper
spray, you cannot stop the pain, so it is not a true pain-compliance
technique. We have seen some courts talk about this. In fact, Head-
waters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt83 addressed this very
issue. This was the pepper spray case where the police officers ap-
plied the pepper spray directly to the eyeballs of the protestors with
Q-tips.84
Pain compliance is a very specific type of police tactic. For
example, and I hope you will appreciate the humor in this, we are
trained in these pressure point control tactics. The tactic I like best is,
if you grab somebody real good under the nose and put some pressure
there, they will do about anything you ask them to do. I tell officers
all over the country, "It works great on my fifteen and seventeen-
year-old sons." Then I tell them, "As soon as I let go of their noses,
what happens to the pain? It's gone. But when I spray those two
kids with pepper spray ...... Do not try that one in front of a jury-it
82 "[O]fficers should be given some discretion on handcuffing, particularly when officers
are dealing with vulnerable classes such as and the elderly, those with disabilities and those
arrestees who indicate that they have a pre-existing injury." Ryan, supra note 63, at 252.
" 276 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002).
84 Id. at 1128-29.
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does not work very well.
Both plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys should be aware of
what is going on with pepper spray because you may get some of
these types of cases.85 We are starting to see some cases with what
law enforcement and courts are referring to the "hydraulic needle ef-
fect., 86 Many officers have not been advised against getting right up
in somebody's eye and hitting them with pepper spray. When pepper
spray comes out under pressure and you are too close to somebody's
eye, it rips through an eyeball like a needle. It is not the pepper spray
that causes the damage. The pepper spray is propelled out of its can-
ister under pressure and comes out in a stream.87 More agencies use
the product commonly known as the stream, as opposed to the fog,
because it carries for a distance.
A. Best Practices
First you want to try to get a can of the spray and see what the
manufacturer says as far as distance. I saw a manufacturer the other
day with a new label that said, "Do not spray from closer than 15
feet." This is a total waste of time from those kinds of distances, but
that is how pepper spray manufacturers are trying to protect them-
85 See, e.g., Martinez v. New Mexico Dep't of Pub. Safety, 47 Fed. App'x. 513, 515, 517
(10th Cir. 2002) (granting qualified immunity to an officer who used pepper spray to subdue
a recalcitrant arrestee). See also Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1343-44, 1348-49 (11 th
Cir. 2002) (holding an officer's repeated use of pepper spray to the detainee's face as exces-
sive).
86 See Ryan, supra note 63, at 267 ("The hydraulic needle effect occurs when a law en-
forcement officer holds the can of pepper-spray too close to someone's eyes .... [S]erious
eye injury may occur if the can is held close to the eye (generally under three feet) and the
stream hits the eye directly." Id.
87 See generally Dwayne Orrick, Practical Pepper Spray Training, LAW & ORDER, Apr.
2004, at 100.
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selves from liability.
B. Over-spraying
Another common pepper spray issue is "over-spraying,"
where pepper spray is used in closed ventilation systems, and
crowded, closed areas.88 An officer from South Carolina told me
how she was guarding a prisoner at the local hospital emergency
room and the prisoner started acting up. The prisoner was not cuffed
because doctors were trying to treat him, so she sprayed the prisoner
with pepper spray. They had to evacuate a whole wing of the hospi-
tal. The chemicals can get sucked into a ventilation system and peo-
ple throughout a building could feel it. Again, this is not a good tool
to use in certain circumstances.
It is also becoming more prevalent for agencies to carry both
pepper spray and Tasers. These agencies have been advised that the
two can co-exist, but must be used with precaution. 89 Many types of
pepper spray are propelled by alcohol, and Tasers, when used, create
a spark. You can figure out the result: combustion. There have been
times when somebody has been sprayed with pepper spray with no
effect, so the officers use their Tasers. The result can be frightening
and there are examples of this happening, so agencies must be very
careful to ensure they do not have combustible pepper spray.
88 Ryan, supra note 63, at 267 ("This can be a particular problem in places like hospitals
and schools. Additionally, if dealing with a crowded enclosed area, persons who are unfa-
miliar with the effects of pepper-spray may become panicked when they began having diffi-
culty breathing.").
89 See, e.g., Gillson v. City of Sparks, No. 03:06-CV-00325-LRH-RAM, 2007 WL
839252, at *1 (D. Nev. Mar. 19, 2007). An arrestee died after allegedly being sprayed with
pepper spray and stunned by a Taser gun ten to fifteen times. Id.
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IV. TASERS
The Taser is a useful law enforcement tool, but one which, if
not used correctly, can cause serious injury. Misuse is one of the is-
sues that arises with Tasers. Torres v. City of Madera9" is, by most
accounts, the worst of these cases.
After arriving in response to a "loud party," police arrested
twenty-two-year-old Everardo Torres after he refused to give his
name, because, he claimed, it was not his house. The officers placed
him in the back seat of their car and although Torres complained the
handcuffs were too tight, none of the officers checked on the fit or
double locked him.91 The officers probably did not have a good rea-
son to arrest him, but did so anyway, and left him in the car for a long
period of time. At some point, Torres began kicking the door and
window of the police car.92 As the watch commander at the scene
came around the car and opened the squad car she reached for her
Taser and told the other officers that she was going to use it to get the
young man to stop.
93
Contrary to the advice of Taser International, the Madera Po-
lice Department made a conscious decision that their officers were
going to wear the Taser on their strong side, the same side the offi-
cers carried their gun. The officer reached down, but mistakenly
90 No. CIVFF02-6385AWILJO, CV F 03-5999, 2005 WL 1683736, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July
11,2005).
91 Torres v. City of Madera, Nos. Civ F 02-6385 AWl LJO, CV F 03-5999, 2006 WL
3257491, at *I (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2006).
92 Torres, 2005 WL 1683736, at *24.
93 Id.
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grabbed her gun, and shot and killed Torres.94 Surprisingly, there are
many similar cases around the country even though officers know the
difference between the Taser and their guns.95 In fact, the same thing
happened a year earlier in Sacramento, California and seven weeks
later in Rochester, Minnesota.96
Taser International explains that officers have muscle mem-
ory control, and reach down to grab the first thing they can get their
hands on.97 Surprisingly, there are still many agencies whose officers
carry the Taser on their strong side. From a police policy and train-
ing standpoint, or law enforcement training policy, there is no excuse
for that. Again, many of the situations occur in the heat of the mo-
ment, and this "muscle memory control" triggers quick deployment.
As a result, there have been a number of these cases.
The Taser is used two different types of ways. The first, and
probably most efficient way from the use-of-force standpoint, is that
it shoots out two probes which are connected by a wire.98 The wire
delivers 50,000 volts to the body, which sounds like a lot, but the
amperage is very low. When the two probes hit the body, they create
a neuro-muscular disruption, causing muscles to contract. 99 Essen-
94 id.
95 See, e.g., Henry v. Pumell, 501 F.3d 374, 376 (4th Cir. 2007) ("While attempting to use
a Taser... [the officer] mistakenly drew his firearm.").
96 Torres, 2005 WL 1683736, at *1; Atak v. Siem, No. Civ. 04-2720DSDSRN, 2005 WL
2105545, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2005).
97 Press Release, Taser Int'l, Taser Tech. - Changing the World and Protecting Lives
(2007), available at
http://taser.com/company/pressroom/Documents/TASER%2oIntl%20Press%2OKit%2012%
2019%2007.pdf.
98 Id. The maximum distance a Taser reaches when shot ranges from fifteen to thirty-five
feet, at more than 160 feet per second. Id.
99 Id.
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tially, the target drops from where they are standing and is rendered
helpless. The original thought was the Taser worked all the time as
long as both probes were attached to the body, but many officers
have reported instances where the Taser did not work well at all.
Other officers report that they used the Taser, even deploying it a
number of different times, but the person was able to continue the ac-
tivity the officer was trying to stop.' 00 There may be defects with the
Taser itself, but at this point there is not enough research to determine
exactly what happens in these instances.
There have also been reports across the country that Taser use
has resulted in a number of deaths. According to Amnesty Interna-
tional's latest report, there have been more than 250 police events
where a Taser was used and someone died within twenty-four
hours.'0' In twelve of those cases, the medical examiners cited the
Taser as a contributing factor, but not the actual cause of death.10 2 In
one instance, however, a medical examiner in Cook County, Illinois
did find a Taser to be the cause of death when it was deployed for
fifty-seven seconds straight-well beyond the recommended use pe-
riod. 0 3 However, the medical examiner later retracted that finding.
1O0 See Staff Report, Teen is Shot by Police Officers, KY. POST, Dec. 3, 2007, at A2 (re-
porting the shooting of a teen because of the mechanical failure of a Taser); Pat Schneider,
$1.5M Claim Filed in Killing by Cop, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Aug. 11, 2006, at B3
(reporting a man fatally was shot after Taser failed); Gary Haber & Chris Echegaray, Police
Shooting Leaves Man Dead, TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 26, 2005, at 1 (reporting a suspect was shot
and killed when a Taser failed to subdue).
101 Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Statement to the U.S. Justice Dep't Inquiry Into Deaths
in Custody (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.amnesty.org (search "U.S. Department
of Justice").
102 Id.
103 David Heinzmann & John Chase, Medical Examiner Ties Death to Officer's Taser,
CHI. TRI., July 30, 2005, at Metro 19.
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Currently, there are many similar cases coming through the
system, including two in Gwinnett County Georgia and one in both
LaGrange, Georgia and Florida, but it will be difficult for the plain-
tiffs to prevail. The National Institute of Justice recently conducted a
study of more than 1,000 Taser uses in 170 departments.10 4 The re-
sults indicate the Taser is a safe and effective tool in most cases.1
0 5
Obviously, this does not mean the current cases may be decided oth-
erwise, but as of right now the opposition to the Taser does not have
a high degree of support. Plus, in many of these cases we have seen
Taser join forces with the police agencies and have brought an unbe-
lievable amount of resources to the table to fight the claims.
The second way the Taser is used is what they call the "push
stun mode" or "drive stun mode." This method is used as a pain
compliance technique, as opposed to causing muscle contraction.
With this technique, the officer takes the darts off of the Taser so the
probes are not shot into to the body. Instead, the officer holds the Ta-
ser without the probes right against the person's skin and applies
pressure, which sends an electrical impulse through the body, causing
pain. This method is more likely to bruise the body than the actual
probes, usually because the person tends to move around when there
is a burning sensation. A bruise consisting of double red dots is a
good indication that the Taser was used in "push stun mode" as op-
posed to probe mode.
104 Press Release, Wake Forest Univ. Baptist Med. Ctr., Nationwide Independent Taser
Study Results Suggest Devices are Safe (Oct. 8, 2007), available at
http://wwwl .wfubmc.edu/news/NewsArticle.htm?/Articleid=2165.
105 Id.
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A. Secondary Impact Claims
Tasers also increasingly present "secondary impact claims."' 0 6
Often, particularly when a Taser is used in probe mode, the person's
muscles contract, causing that person to collapse.
10 7
There was one training method which allowed use of the Ta-
ser in all instances when the suspect was running away. This causes
a major problem because there is a difference between someone try-
ing to run away on a football field and someone running down train
tracks. The person running on a football field, when shot from be-
hind, lands on soft grass. But, what happens when that same runner
is shot from behind on train tracks? That person will collapse and
slam face first into the tracks, and that may cause some dramatic in-
jury. This must be taken into account.
Apparently, agencies are becoming more cognizant of the in-
juries that "secondary impact" can cause. For instance, some agen-
cies are now instructing officers to consider the seriousness of the of-
fense in conjunction with the need to stop flight before deploying the
Taser. 10 8 In an interesting case from Washington, an agency was
called in response to a suicidal man threatening to jump off a bridge.
One of the officers decided it might be a good idea to try to "Tase"
the man to get him off. Apparently, the Taser failed and the man
leapt to his death.'0 9
106 See Ryan, supra note 63, at 258.
107 See, e.g., Parker v. City of South Portland, No. 06-129-P-S, 2007 WL 1468658, at *3.
(D. Me. May 18, 2007).
108 See e.g., Amnesty Int'l, supra note 101 (noting the importance of balancing the dan-
gers of the use of force against the threat the situation poses).
109 See Nick Eaton, Police Weighed Jumper's Past: Levy Known for Not'Sticking to
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Unfortunately, some officers will use the Taser, like any other
new law enforcement tool, more often than necessary. One training
video shows three officers arresting a pretty compliant suspect.
While one officer is trying to handcuff the suspect, the other two had
their Taser's out. This clearly demonstrates that the officers think of
this as a new toy and are really itching to try it out, because a situa-
tion like that definitely did not require them to have their Tasers'
drawn. Another issue is the use of multiple deployments. All of the
training and studies available discourage multiple Tasers applied to a
single suspect, and repeated application of the electric current."0 The
Police Executive Research Forum's ("PERF"), most recent materials
state that only one officer should deploy and activate at a time, but
there are instances where officers activate their Tasers longer than
they are trained."'
B. Abuse of the Taser by Officers
Another set of cases deals with the abuse of the Taser by offi-
cers. These cases focus on the Graham three-part test. 12 The De-
Salvo' 13 case out of Collinsville, Illinois, was on summary judgment
for qualified immunity where an officer was accused of abusing an
Agreements, SPOKESMAN-REv. (Spokane, Wash.), Aug. 4, 2007, at lB. But see Steve Lyttle,
Taser Stops Possible Suicide, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Aug. 16, 2006 (page unavailable).
110 See, e.g., Training Guidelines, PERF Center on Force & Accountability, PERE Con-
ducted Energy Device Policy and Training Guidelines for Consideration (Oct. 25, 2005),
http://policeforum.org (follow "Free Doc Library" hyperlink; then follow "Use of Force"
hyperlink; then follow "PERF CED Guidelines" hyperlink).
... See id.
112 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. See also Ryan, supra note 63, at 244.
11 DeSalvo v. City of Collinsville, No. 04-CV-0718-MJR, 2005 WL 2487829, at *1 (S.D.
Ill. Oct. 7, 2005).
29
Blum and Ryan: Recent Developments in the Use of Excessive Force by Law Enforcem
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2008
TOURO LA WREVIEW
arrestee. 14 An officer was called to disperse a crowd and became
upset when one man did not move fast enough." 5 While the officer
grabbed the man by his arm, another younger man told the officer to
leave the older man alone because the older man was doing nothing
wrong." 6 The officer responded by handcuffing the younger man
and ordered him into the back of his squad car." 7 When the officer
was asked several times for the reason for the arrest, he became an-
gered and held the probes of his Taser over the man's head for spark
testing; six seconds later the officer put the probes on the man's neck
and let him have it in the push-stun mode." 8 The young man contin-
ued to ask for the reason for his arrest and refused to get in the police
car so the officer allegedly put the probes on his forehead this time
and let him have it again. 19 The facts of these cases are amazing, but
they are by no means isolated incidents.
I was in Collinsville doing a training exercise and the officer
involved in DeSalvo approached me because he heard how I ex-
plained the case. He wanted to stress that the jury found in his favor
after fifteen minutes of deliberation, despite being denied summary
judgment and qualified immunity. The trial court, he explained,
viewed the video of the incident and found he had not put the probes
against the young man's forehead. More importantly, whether right
or wrong, he was actually trained to put the probe against the neck in
114 Id. at *3.
115 Id. at *1.
116 Id.
"' Id. at *1-2.
118 DeSalvo, 2005 WL 2487829 at *2.
119 Id. Four other officers witnessesd the encounter and later testified that DeSalvo
showed no signs of aggression or resistance. Id.
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the "push stun mode." Apparently, this is the reason the jury came
back in his favor in such a short period of time. Nonetheless, if the
situation occurred the way in which the court looked at it on sum-
mary judgment, it certainly was an abuse which could never be justi-
fied.
There is an interesting video out of an Eleventh Circuit case's
court file, Draper v. Reynolds,120 which is shown to police officers all
around the country. An officer was alone on a highway with a truck
driver he pulled over. The driver failed to comply with the officer's
orders to hand him his papers five times. 12' During the encounter, the
driver kept walking away and coming back to the officer in a threat-
ening and menacing manner, raising his hands as he did so. 2 2 After
the officer's fifth request, he fired his Taser at the man who immedi-
ately collapsed. 123 Backup arrived and the man was handcuffed by
another officer, who placed his knee onto the man's back further
forcing the probe into his chest. 24
The video is shown to police officers all around the country
and the responses are always the same: "How much did they [the po-
lice department] pay," and "Is that officer still working there?" The
answer to the first question is the police department did not pay. The
Eleventh Circuit dismissed the case because the officer was alone on
the highway in a tense and uncertain situation. 25 Secondly, the offi-
120 369 F.3d 1270 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
121 The items requested were the driver's license, insurance, bill of lading, and log book.
Id. at 1273.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1273-74 n.5.
125 Draper, 369 F.3d at 1278.
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cer is still working. Most officers who view the Draper video are
surprised by the Eleventh Circuit's decision, however it seems that
the Eleventh Circuit views the Taser as a low-level use of force and
upon viewing the tape observed a person who was non-compliant
with the command presence of an officer. Other circuits would not
necessarily agree.
V. CONCLUSION
Use of force is one of the high-liability areas in law enforce-
ment. It requires continuous training and review. Officers cannot
simply be trained on skill and tactics, but must also be trained on how
to make proper decisions. Graham provides the road map for these
decisions and should not be overlooked.
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